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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the "reapportionment revolution," decades of precedent held
that the legislative district boundaries were not justiciable, no matter
how little the districts reflected population distributions. In Baker v.
Carr, a majority of justices declared for the first time that courts could
* Department of Political Science, Columbia University, JRL2124@columbia.edu.
** Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego,
mat@mccubbins.org.
1. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
indeed address these disparities. Chief Justice Earl Warren thought his
reapportionment decisions the most important of his tenure on the
Supreme Court. This Article evaluates the impact of these decisions on
legislative politics and policymaking.
We examine three indicators of change. In the first, we test the impact
of two key reapportionment cases, Reynolds v. Sims2 and Wesberry v.
Sanders,3 on policies favoring rural and urban interests. We measure
impact using the "event study" approach, which is a well-known and
well-developed methodology within the finance literature, but one
perhaps underused within political science and law (despite being a
natural application of standard research designs).4 In an event study,
significant "abnormal" changes in politically sensitive stock values
(here, those of "rural" or "urban" stocks) immediately following
important events are used to show that market traders anticipated large
policy effects at key steps in the policymaking process-here, including
decisions by the courts. In equilibrium, given the efficient markets
hypothesis (discussed in greater detail below), these anticipated policy
effects imply actual policy effects, as getting it wrong can be very costly.
An event study provides an immediate and instant measure of
anticipated policy change, one unclouded by other events that occur over
time. Testing financial impact thus allows us to test political impact.
Our analysis shows that these decisions had significant impacts.
Specifically, the changes in political composition brought about by
Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims shifted the benefits of public policy
toward urban interests and away from rural interests. Whether or not the
courts are the least dangerous branch,5 informed investors clearly
believed that they are indeed a potentially dangerous branch.
The second effect of reapportionment that we study is the relationship
of Southern Democrats to the rest of the Democratic Party in the U.S.
House of Representatives and in the U.S. Senate. The redistricting
revolution can be seen as the last gasp of Southern reconstruction. Many
of the most misaligned states were in the South and Southern
representation would be most affected by the Court's orders. One effect
would be that Southern Democrats would begin to have districts that
were more like their Northern counterparts, and as a result we expect to
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
4. Specifically, we are employing multiple single-group regression point
displacement tests. See William M.K. Trochim, The Research Methods Knowledge Base
(Aug. 2, 2000), available at http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/.
5. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
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see the ideology and voting records of Southern Democrats begin to look
more like rest of their party. For example, we expect to see Southern
Democrats being "rolled" less frequently (that is, voting against bills
that ultimately pass) after the redistricting decision than before the
redistricting decisions take effect. This is a direct consequence of their
shift in ideology toward the center of their party. Rohde documents that
during the 1970s the voting behavior of Southern Democrats in the U.S.
House began to resemble more closely the voting of the rest of the
Democratic Party.6 Additionally, he argues that a variety of House
reforms that empowered the majority party were a result of the greater
ideological homogeneity of Democrats during the 1970s. He claims that
this change in preferences within the Democratic Party was driven by
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which changed the constituencies of many
Southern Democrats. 7 In this Article, we argue that court-ordered,
redistricting also had an effect on the voting behavior of Southern
Democrats independent of the effect of the Voting Rights Act. If the
cause of the change in ideology of Southern Democrats is court-ordered
redistricting, then we should not see changes in voting among U.S.
Senators whose constituent boundaries remained unaffected by the court
decisions.
In our third test, we examine the political changes wrought by a
similar set of cases affecting the California legislature. Specifically, we
examine the shift in the legislature from division along urban-rural lines
to division along partisan lines. We argue that this change can be seen by
examining the change in agenda control exercised by the majority party
between the 1960s and the 1990s. We predict that, in both the California
Assembly and Senate, we should see that agenda control begins to
reflect partisan divisions rather than the previous urban versus rural split.
II. REAPPORTIONMENT AND REAPPORTIONMENT RESEARCH
In Colegrove v. Green,' the Supreme Court reiterated its long-standing
doctrine that apportionment was not justiciable. This was the law of the
land when a group of Tennessee voters brought suit to challenge the
apportionment of their legislature which continued to use the 1901,
apportionment, despite the requirement of reapportionment every ten
6. DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 40-82
(1991).
7. Id.
8. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
years under the state constitution. City and urban areas had as little as
one-tenth the representation they were entitled to on the basis of
population. Under Colegrove, however, courts could do nothing to
remedy this. The overruling of Colegrove in Baker v. Carr,9 was only
the first step in a revolution that would change the dynamics of
representation throughout the country. Baker on its own, however, only
declared state legislative reapportionment justiciable. It took a series of
subsequent cases to flesh out the new doctrine of apportionment. Soon,
the Court established a "one man, one vote" standard for state-wide
primary elections in Gray v. Sanders, ° and then extended it to the U.S.
House of Representatives in Wesberry v. Sanders" and to both houses of
state legislatures in Reynolds v. Sims. 2 In the period immediately following
Baker, the most commonly studied question was whether urban interests
benefited and rural interests suffered from reapportionment. Most
analyses showed little or no effect. 3 Following in this line of research,
McCubbins and Schwartz argued that the subsequent redistricting created a
new metropolitan majority in the U.S. House of Representative, which
lead to increased appropriations for urban interests and a reduction in
appropriations directed at rural constituents.'4 Using a time-series analysis
of federal appropriations, they find changes in agricultural, regulatory
and transportation policy that are driven by the change in congressional
representation. During the 1970s, scholarly attention was then largely
redirected to the relationship between apportionment and the incumbency
effect' 5 and then in the 1980s to the partisan effects of redistricting.' 6
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
11. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
12. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. William E. Bicker, The Effects of Malapportionment in the States: A Mistrial,
in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 151 (N. Poslsby ed., 1971); TIMOTHY G. O'ROURKE,
THE IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT (1980); Robert S. Erikson, Malapportionment,
Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes, in Congressional Elections, 66 AM. POL. SCi. REV.
1234 (1972); Brian R. Fry & Richard F. Winters, The Politics of Redistribution, 64 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 508 (1970); Richard Hofferbert, The Relation Between Public Policy and
Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States, 60 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 73 (1966); Herbert Jacob, The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of
Caution, 43 Soc. FORCES 256 (1964); David Saffel, Reapportionment and Public Policy:
State Legislator's Perspectives, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 203
(Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert B. McKay, & Howard A. Scarrow eds., 1982).
14. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congress, the Courts, and Public
Policy: Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388 (1988).
15. Charles S. Bullock, Ill, Redistricting and Congressional Stability, 1962- 72, 37
J. POL. 569 (1975); John Ferejohn, The Decline of Competition in Congressional
Elections, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 166 (1977); Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship
between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 540 (1973).
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More recent work has focused on developing formal models of partisan
gerrymandering"7 and on using court-ordered redistricting as a natural
experiment for testing the effect that changes in a county's state
legislative representation has on that county's share of state revenue.' 8
Recently, scholars have again picked up on the relationship between
redistricting and the incumbency advantage. Cox and Katz study how
the redistricting decisions of the 1960s changed the electoral aspects of
the political process.' 9  They present evidence that the redistricting
decisions of the 1960s increased the incumbency advantage, because
now incumbents could foresee regular redistricting and could retire
strategically before they would be forced from office in a new district.
Outside of the South, the authors also find that the redistricting decisions
advantaged Democratic politicians at the expense of Republicans.
We turn now to assessing the political impact of the redistricting
revolution.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN, PREDICTIONS, DATA, AND RESULTS
OF THE EVENT STUDY
A. Research Design
For an overview of the research design and statistical model we
employ, see Lax and McCubbins.2 °
16. Richard Born, Partisan Intentions and Election Day Realities in the
Congressional Redistricting Process, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 307 (1985); Bruce E.
Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 320 (1985).
17. GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002); PHILIP
MUSGROVE, THE GENERAL THEORY OF GERRYMANDERING (1977); Guillermo Owen &
Bernard Grofman, Optimal Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 5, 6
(1988); Katerina Sherstyuk, How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis, 95 PUB. CHOICE 1
(1988); Thomas W. Gilligan & John G. Matsusaka, Structural Constraints on Bias
Under the Efficient Partisan Gerrymander, 100 PUB. CHOICE 65 (1999).
18. Stephen Ansolabehere, Alan Gerber, and James Snyder, Equal Votes, Equal
Money: Court Ordered Redistricting and the Distribution of Public Expenditures in the
American States, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 767-77 (2002). Ansolabehere, Gerber, and
Snyder in particular argue this as a demonstration of how courts can shape public policy.
Id.
19. Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias
in U.S. Congressional Elections, 43 AM. J. POL. Sci. 812, 813 (1999).
20. Jeffrey R. Lax & Mathew D. McCubbins, Courts, Congress and Public Policy
Part I: The FDA, the Courts, and the Regulation of Tobacco, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 163 (2006).
B. Events and Predictions
The redistricting revolution suggests a number of key events to study.
Specifically, we examine the effects of the Supreme Court's redistricting
decisions on stock returns, concentrating on two decisions that were
surprising.2" For each of these decisions, we make a pair of directional
predictions (one for rural stocks and one for urban stocks) and use two-
day event windows.22  The chance that there exist unnoticed
confounding events on these exact days is vanishingly small and we
have surveyed articles in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal
archives to see if we could find any news reported at these times that
would have affected the confidence of our findings. Furthermore, our
predictions vary in size by type of stock, which makes for a more
powerful test of our hypotheses. We also include an analysis of aircraft
companies, which we expect to be unaffected by the Supreme Court's
redistricting decisions, and therefore to act as a control group of stocks.
If we find that the key stocks and the control stocks are affected as
predicted, we increase our confidence that the court decision was the
cause.
The events we study, as well as our (positive or negative) predictions
for impact, are as follows:
21. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). There were, of course, many other
Supreme Court redistricting decisions-e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969), and White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). We examined many of these
decisions and found few effects on urban and rural stocks, though this was to be
expected. By the time these other cases reached the Court, the Court's decisions in
Baker, Wesberry, and Reynolds had largely eliminated the surprise element that is
required for an event to affect stock returns. Indeed, given the lack of surprise, if we had
found significant results for these later cases, it would have suggested (in opposition to
the efficient markets hypothesis) that the market moved simply in response to a court
decision and not because the decision revealed new information related to firm
profitability. We were not able to analyze the effects of the Baker decision, because the
stock market data for the period immediately following Baker, is not readily available.
22. We utilize a two-day event window to account for the (relatively) slower
transmission of information in the 1960s.
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EVENT DATE URBAN RURAL AIRCRAFT
PREDICTION PREDICTION PREDICTION
1. Wesberry v. Feb. 17, + - No effect
Sanders, decided 1964
2. Reynolds v. June 15, + - No effect
Sims, decided 1964
C. Data
To examine the impact on urban interests, we use two subsets of
stocks that should be correlated with urban development: Steel Works
composed of 27 stocks and Subdividers and Developers composed of 21
stocks. Rural interests are harder to capture with reference to publicly traded
firms, but one clear choice is Coal (9 stocks). Our control group consists of
aircraft manufacturing companies (9 stocks). The market's rate of return
is taken from the standard source, the Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP)2 3 equally-weighted index of all NYSE/AMEX stocks on the
given day.24  The list of urban and rural stocks comes from the U.S.
Department of Labor's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
D. Results
One must believe that the market traders make good (not perfect, but
merely unbiased) predictions about the direction and magnitude of
policy change, a safe assumption given their strong financial incentives
to do so. If this is believed-and if the research design takes into
account certain assumptions (as we have) 2 -then the reactions of the
23. This is the standard data; citations to the CRSP data number in the thousands.
24. While it is possible to use an index with size-weighted returns with little
change in the results, the equally-weighted index is the recommended choice. See
Stephen Brown & Jerome B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event
Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 25 (1985); Chuck C.Y. Kwok & LeRoy D. Brooks,
Examining Event Study Methodologies in Foreign Exchange Markets, 21 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 189, 219 (1990). When the sample contains firms of only one size (which is not the
case here), the equally-weighted index can bias against finding significant results using t-
tests. See S.P. Kothari, & Charles E. Wasley, Measuring Security Price Performance in
Size-Clustered Samples, 64 AccT. REv. 228, 247 (1989); G. William Schwert, Size and
Stock Returns, and Other Empirical Regularities, 12 J. FiN. ECON. 3 (1983).
25. As McWilliams and Siegel point out,
readers can be confident that the conclusions from an event study are valid only if
they are confident that the researcher has truly identified the abnormal returns
market to events represent anticipated policy effects which must, in
equilibrium, represent unbiased predictions of actual policy effects.2 6
Tables 2A and 2B present, respectively, the Wesberry and Reynolds
results.
Many of the effects for these two events were in the predicted
directions, though not equally significant. Overall, the key results
emerge for the Wesberry decision-a finding that is not surprising given
that Wesberry came before Reynolds (thus reducing the surprise value of
Reynolds) and given that Wesberry ordered the redrawing of congressional
districts for the U.S. House of Representatives (as opposed to Reynolds
for state legislatures).
TABLE 2A: THE IMPACT OF WESBERRY V. SANDERS ON
URBAN AND RURAL STOCKS
1964 February 17th and 18th
Aggregate Joint Impact
Impact
URBAN STOCKS
(prediction +)
2. Steel Works (3312) 1.58 52.22(0.05)** (0.01)***
5. Subdividers and Developers (6552) .12 15.09
(0.45) (0.77)
associated with the event [which] relies on the following assumptions: (1) markets
are efficient, (2) the event was unanticipated, and (3) there were no confounding
events during the event window.
Abigail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, Event Studies in Management Research:
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 626, 629 (1997).
26. The event study methodology only captures the lower bound of policy effects.
Any anticipated portion of the event's effects will have already been incorporated into
market prices and will thus be part of the normal return. Accordingly, the results may
very well understate the effects of the events. What we would emphasize in the results is
that we have tested a pattern of predictions (positive for some stock samples and
negative for others) and a number of them yield highly significant results. Our
conclusions do not rest on any one test, but rather a pattern of results. When we do get
significant results, the implication is that relevant and surprising information was
revealed during the event window; where the results do not meet statistical significance,
we cannot conclude that there was no effect, but rather that the event was not informative
(either it was indeed irrelevant or simply not sufficiently surprising). Judicial decisions
are not "informative" to the extent they have already been predicted; it is the resolution
of residual uncertainty that provides new information.
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All Urban Stocks 1.18 72.43
(0.12) (0.01)***
RURAL STOCKS
(prediction -)
1. Coal (1211) -1.30" 16.44"
(0.10) (0.06)
AIRCRAFT STOCKS -0.23 0.83
(prediction 0) 0.41 0.9997
* significant at 10% level ** significant at 5% level *** significant at 1% level
Note: The coefficient for the aggregate test is the z-stat and for the joint test is the )?-value.
The p-values are in parentheses (one-tailed for the directional predictions of the aggregate
tests, two-tailed for the joint tests).
TABLE 2B: THE IMPACT OF REYNOLDS V. SIMS ON URBAN
AND RURAL STOCK
1964 June 15
t and 16th
Aggregate Joint Impact
Impact
URBAN STOCKS
(prediction +)
2. Steel Works (3312) 1.61** 36.41
(0.05) (0.11)
5. Subdividers and Developers (6552) -0.95 9.77
(0.17) (0.97)
All Urban Stocks 0.40 52.05
(0.35) (0.28)
RURAL STOCKS
(prediction -)
1. Coal (1211) 0.07 6.00
(0.47) (0.74)
AIRCRAFT STOCKS 0.43 6.35
(prediction 0) (0.33) (0.70)
* significant at 10/o level ** significant at 5% level *** significant at 1% level.
Note: The coefficient for the aggregate test is the z-stat and for the joint test is the )-value. The p-
values are in parentheses (one-tailed for the directional predictions of the aggregate tests, two-tailed
for the joint tests).
1. Event 1. Wesberry v. Sanders
We find a number of significant results for the Wesberry decision. At
the most general level, we find that urban stocks performed exactly as
predicted-that is, there was a statistically significant increase for out
sample of urban stocks using the joint impact test. The effect on rural
stocks is weaker, but significant. Indeed, both of the aggregate impact
tests for coal stocks showed a statistically significant decrease following
the Court's decision. The aircraft stocks show no effect from the
redistricting decisions. Thus, our predictions are borne out in our
analysis of Wesberry.
2. Event 2: Reynolds v. Sims
The results for Reynolds are weaker than those for Wesberry, but one
is worth noting. Steel stocks showed a significant increase. However,
we find no significant results for rural stocks during the two days
following this decision.
IV. REDISTRICTING AND THE U.S. CONGRESS
As previously discussed, a considerable amount of the scholarship on
redistricting has focused on its effects in the U.S. Congress. In this Part,
we again draw from the literature on congressional organization to
examine two hypotheses about the effects of redistricting. The first
prediction is that as congressional districts are redrawn and the
constituents of Southern Democrats begin to resemble more closely
those of Northern Democrats, we should observe the perceived ideology;
of Southern Democrats becoming increasingly similar to the rest of their
party. The second prediction is derived from Cox and McCubbins'
model of legislative agenda setting. 7 They argue that members who are
closer to their party median should also have lower roll rates (as defined
above) than members who lie on the ideological fringes of their party.28
We examine whether the roll rates of Southern Democrats begin to look
more like the rest of their party after redistricting took effect. Because
U.S. Senators were not affected by the Court's redistricting decisions,
we should not see a change in the roll rates or ideology of the Senators
from the South as a result of the Supreme Court's redistricting decisions.
We test multiple predictions about the effect of congressional redistricting,
27. GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA:
RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005).
28. See id. (offering an analysis of individual roll rates and ideological location in
the U.S. Congress).
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which makes this a non-equivalent dependent variables design, increasing
the confidence we have in our findings.
29
To test the first prediction regarding the ideological location of House
members we utilize DW-NOM1NATE scores,3" which are the standard
measure of legislator preferences. 3' In Figure 1, we present the
difference between the DW-NOMINATE score of the Democratic Party
median and the average of the Southern Democrats in both the House
and Senate. For this analysis Southern Democrats were defined as
members of Congress from the states Key considers to be within the
South.32 During the time period under consideration, Congress also
passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which by changing who votes in
elections might also affect legislative behavior. The Senate and the
House were both affected by the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, so
we expect to see a change in the ideological distance in both houses of
Congress. As expected, Figure 1 shows that Southern Democrats moved
closer to the rest of their party in both the House and Senate. The
dramatic decline in the distance between Southern Democrats and their
party's median is consistent with the findings of Rohde3 3 who finds that
the party unity scores of Southern Democrats also begin to look much
more like the rest of their party, although he attributes the change to the
Voting Rights Act.
29. Trochim, supra note 6.
30. See generally KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997).
31. We do not take these measures to reveal true preferences, but rather as a
measure of revealed preference that is a result of both true preferences and institutional
setting. Regardless, if we see that Southern Democrats look more like their Northern
counterparts we can conclude that either their true preferences were changing or some
institutional factor (House rules, constituency characteristics, etc) was causing a change
in their preferences. Both of these are consistent with the effects of reapportionment.
The methodology for generating the DW-NOMINATE scores and the data used in this
analysis can be obtained from Keith Poole's website http://www.voteview.com.
32. Key classifies the following states as Southern: Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and
Tennessee. See generally V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949).
33. Rohde, supra note 8, at 40-82.
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FIGURE 1: DISTANCE BETWEEN SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS AND
DEMOCRATIC MEDIAN ON DW-NOMINATE SCALE
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To sort out the impact of the Voting Rights Act and reapportionment/
redistricting we can compare changes in the House to those in the
Senate. Members of both the Senate and House are affected by the
Voting Rights Act, but only the House is affected by redistricting.
Therefore, we can estimate the effect of redistricting by examining
differences in behavior between the House and Senate. The amount of
ideological movement is greater in the House than in the Senate.3 4 Not
only is the change greater in the House, but it also occurs much more
quickly. This suggests that changes in legislative behavior are not solely
a function of the Voting Rights Act, but that redistricting has an
independent effect on legislative behavior.35
34. In the House the mean distance between Southern Democrats and the rest of
the party drops 0.12 between 90th and 95th Congress and in the Senate the mean
distance drops 0.025 between the 90th and 95th Congress. The Congresses chosen
reflect the period before redistricting effects were felt and a period after we expect
legislators to have changed their behavior.
35. One might argue that the House changes more quickly than the Senate because
of the difference in the electoral cycle. However, we would expect Senators to adapt
their voting behavior prior to re-election, if they believed it would affect their electoral
fortunes.
210
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To test the second prediction, Figure 2 shows the average roll rate of
Southern Democrats and the average roll rates of non-southern members
in both the House and Senate. The roll rates of the Southern Democrats
become much closer to their Northern counterparts after the 91 st Congress.
Furthermore, Table 3 demonstrates that the roll rates of Southern
Democrats in the House are significantly lower during the 92nd to 96th
Congresses than in the earlier period, whereas the roll rates of the rest of
the party show no significant change as we would predict when the
Democrats are the majority in all of the Congresses under consideration.
The roll rates of U.S. Senators clearly decline during this period, but
there does not appear to be a systematic change in the relationship
between Southern and Northern Democrats in the Senate, as we would
expect if redistricting were the cause. A comparison between the roll
rates of Senators and Representatives also suggests that in the Senate,
Southern Democrats never differed as much from the rest of their party
as in the House.
36
FIGURE 2A AND 2B: AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL ROLL RATES,
U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE
Average Individual Rollrate U.S. House
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36. The other obvious finding is that individual roll rates are generally higher in
the Senate than in the House, although this has no import for redistricting.
Average IndIvidual Rollrate, U.S. Senate
045
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TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL ROLL RATES U.S. HOUSE,
SOUTHERN VS. NON-SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS
86th-91st 9 2 nd- 9 6 th Early period >
congress congress Later period
t-value
(p-stat)
Southern 20.6% 16.6% 1.87
Democrats roll rate (.05)
Non-southern 9.3% 9.8% -0.27
Democrats roll rate (.60)
V. REAPPORTIONMENT IN CALIFORNIA
3 7
The series of Court decisions that lead to the widespread redistricting
across the country in the 1960s profoundly affected California politics as
well. It took nearly two decades for California to fully respond to the
Supreme Court decisions, but the changes wrought by redistricting gave
37. Much of this Part is based on Beamer, which we have extended, reanalyzing
the data she collected. See Melanie Beamer, Parties Divided The Struggle for Majority
Status within the California Legislature (2000) (unpublished undergraduate honors
thesis, UCSD) (on file with author).
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the urban areas of California greater weight in the political process, and
changed the primary dimension of California politics from an urban-
rural divide in the 1960s to a partisan Democratic-Republican divide in
the 1990s. In this Part, we examine evidence of the change in the
primary dimension of political conflict and draw upon the model of
legislative organization devised by Cox and McCubbins38 to demonstrate
that legislative politics changed profoundly after the 1960s.
On May 14, 1969, the Los Angeles Times reported: "The fall from
power Tuesday of State Senate Leader Hugh Burns marks the end of
more than a century of nonpartisan northern, rural control of California's
Senate."39 The Times noted that Senator Way, Burns' successor, like
Burns, came from a "strongly agricultural district and was not big city-
oriented in any manner.... However, the fact remained that despite the
immediate causes that led to Way's move against Burns it all began with
the historic 'one man, one vote' ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in
1962.''40 The Times directly stated that Burns' ousting "would have
never succeeded had the Senate not been forced into the reapportionment
by the Supreme Court in 1965."4'
L.A. Times reporter, Tom Goff, further explained that:
It began when the reapportioned Senate took office in 1967. In the 1966 election,
when every Senate seat was laid on the line, only 18 of the old-timers survived.
There were 22 new senators, mostly representing burgeoning, urban areas,
anxious to be heard. Many of the newcomers had moved over from the Assembly,
where party lines were tightly drawn as were issues. Many of the new senators-
both Republican and Democrat, conservative and liberal-found to their increasing
agitation that friendship and seniority counted more in the Senate. Their voices
mostly fell on deaf ears. Committees remained tightly locked in the control of
members of the old guard. And it was an old guard that knew the game and
played it with skill. 42
Journalists writing about reapportionment in the 1960s clearly thought
that the court decisions would have a considerable effect on the
38. COX & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 28.
39. Tom Goff, Burns' Long Reign Over Upper House Rural Control Seen Fading,
L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1969, front page [hereinafter Goff, Burn's Long Reign]; Tom Goff,
GOP Legislators Hold Futile Talks, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1968, at 3; Tom Goff,
Democrats Retain Legislative Control: But Republicans in Both Houses Put Up Battle,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1968, at 3; Miller, Key Democratic Leader in the Senate, Dies:
Death Gives GOP Control of Upper House, 20 to 19, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1969, at 3.
40. Goff, Burns 'Long Reign, supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. Id.
organization of the California legislature. We can more systematically
test the effect by drawing from the literature on legislative organization.
Specifically, we apply Cox and McCubbins' procedural cartel theory43 to
the California legislature: we examine the model's core prediction that if
the majority party possesses agenda control they can protect themselves
from floor votes on legislation that more than half of the party opposes.
Conversely, if the minority party lacks the ability to protect its members,
then it should face a considerable number of votes that a majority of the
party would prefer not to pass.
Cox and McCubbins define votes on which a majority of a party votes
against a bill, but the bill passes nonetheless, as a roll.44 The theory
predicts that the majority party, if it possesses agenda control, should
never be rolled whereas the minority party can be rolled as it lacks
control of the legislative agenda.45 If we find that roll rates are equal
between the majority and minority then we have reason to believe that
the legislative process is instead not structured along party lines.
Therefore, they argue that roll rates (number of rolls divided by number
of non-unanimous final passage votes) are evidence of the presence or
absence of agenda control.
An analysis of the majority party's ability to control the legislative
agenda during the 1960s and 1990s reveals stark differences. Focusing
on roll rates in the 1960s and 1990s makes it clear that in the 1960s
votes were largely along non-partisan lines, whereas in the 1990s they
are clearly along party lines.4 6 The roll rates from the 1960s suggest that
the majority did not control the legislative agenda, as both parties' roll
rates are greater than zero and close to each other. In the 1990s, however,
there is a dramatic change in roll rates. As shown in Table 4A for the
Senate and 4B for the Assembly, the majority's roll rate declines
significantly and the minority party sees a considerable increase in its
roll rate in both the Assembly and Senate. The pattern of changes in roll
rates is evidence that both California Assembly and Senate moved from
a relatively non-partisan arrangement in the 1960s and 1970s to a clearly
partisan division in the 1990s.
43. Cox & McCubbins, supra note 28.
44. Id.
45. Id. (chapter 2 for the formal statement and derivation of these predictions).
46. This analysis includes all non-unanimous third reading votes in the California
Senate in 1967, 1968, 1969, 1991, and 1993. Id. In the Assembly our data include non-
unanimous third reading votes from 1967-1972 and 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1996. Id.
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TABLE 4A: COMPARISON OF ROLL RATES IN CALIFORNIA
SENATE, 1960s AND 1990S
1960s 1990s
and 1970
Majority Roll rate 5.6% 0.6%
Minority Roll rate 7.5% 34%
Minority Roll rate> Majority Roll rate 0.71 109
t-value (p-stat) (.26) (.003)
** two-tailed t-test values
TABLE 4B: COMPARISON OF ROLL RATES 1N CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY, 1960S AND 1990S
1960s 1990s
and 1970
Majority Roll rate 6.5% 9.3%
Minority Roll rate 17.5% 46.5%
Minority Roll rate> Majority Roll rate 2.35 2.10
t-value (p-stat) (.03) (0.06)
**two tailed t-test values
While the three decade "event window" for this study allows many
challenges to the internal validity of our argument, the data presented is
consistent with both the writings of journalists during the 1960s and the
findings from the event study and the subsequent Part on U.S. Congress.
Taken together, the consistency of these results increases the confidence
in our conclusion that redistricting is the cause of the change from an
urban-rural divide to a partisan divide in the California legislature.
VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this Article, we predict changes in public policy and politics that
result from the Supreme Court's redistricting decisions. We presented
three types of evidence here for the impact of the redistricting revolution
on politics and policy. The first was an event study of the market
reaction to key decisions. The second was an analysis of changes in
Congress. The third examined changes in the California Legislature. Taken
together, these results suggest that there were considerable political
effects of redistricting. Our results from California suggest that
redistricting led to a partisan alignment of the state legislature and the
beginning of a highly partisan legislative environment. In the U.S.
House of Representatives, it appears that redistricting brought Northern
and Southern Democrats ideologically closer together.
By specifying a number of different predictions that involve multiple
measures of the impact of the Court's decisions, we employ a non-
equivalent dependent variable research design.4 7 Such a design increases
the confidence we have in our results, because we specify not just one
prediction, but multiple predictions of varying directionality. This
makes it less likely that an omitted variable is driving the results we
observe. The results confirm that redistricting had an effect on both
congressional politics and public policy.
47. Trochim, supra note 6.
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TABLE 1: "URBAN" AND "RURAL" STOCKS
URBAN STOCKS
Steel Works (3312)
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Wheeling Steel Corp.
Dominion Bridge Ltd.
Phoenix Steel Corp.
Pittsburgh Steel Co.
Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.
Alan Wood Steel Co.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co.
National Steel Corp.
Kropp Forge Co.
United States Steel Corp.
Inland Steel Co.
Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp.
Shahmoon Industries Inc.
Continental Steel Corp.
Lukens Steel Co.
Carpenter Steel Co.
Woodward Iron Co.
Interlake Iron Corp.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
Sharon Steel Corp.
Continental Copper & Steel Inds.
Mclouth Steel Corp.
Republic Steel Corp.
Armco Steel Corp.
Detroit Steel Corp.
Northwestern Steel & Wire Co.
Subdividers and Developers (6552)
American Realty & Pete Corp.
Lee Rubber & Tire Corp.
Gulf States Ln & Inds Inc.
Kaufman & Broad Bldg Co.
Bloomfield Bldg Inds Inc.
Universal Marion Corp.
Desilu Prons Inc.
Canaveral International Corp.
Southern Realty & Utilities Corp.
All State Properties Inc.
Gulf American Land Corp.
Levitt & Sons Inc.
Peel Elder Ltd.
First National Realty &
Construction Corp.
General Development Corp.
Royal American Industries Inc.
Kavanau Corp.
Presidential Realty Corp.
Deltona Corp.
Christiana Oil Corp.
Presidential Realty Corp.
RURAL STOCKS
Coal (1211)
Ayrshire Collieries Corp.
Island Creek Coal Co.
Pittston Co.
North American Coal Corp.
Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co.
Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co.
Consolidation Coal Inc. Pa.
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associate
Peabody Coal Co.
AIRCRAFT STOCKS (3721)
McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
Cessna Aircraft Corp.
Beech Aircraft Corp.
Fairchild Aircraft Corp.
Northrup Corp.
Howell Electric Motors Corp.
General Dynamics Corp.
Boeing Corp.
Lockheed Corp.
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